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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE -

VENUE -

ARTICLE

74

OF THE CODE

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Plaintiffs, one a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, the
other a resident of Orleans Parish, instituted suit in Orleans to
recover for mental anguish and damages to credit rating resulting from an alleged wrongful seizure of land in Livingston Parish. Defendant, a resident of Livingston Parish, excepted on the
ground that Orleans Parish was an improper venue because the
damage was the result of a wrongful act occurring in Livingston
Parish. Held, proper venue for an action to recover damages
to compensate for mental distress resulting from a wrongful
seizure is either the domicile of the defendant or the situs of
the wrongful act which caused the damage. Article 741 of the
Code of Civil Procedure providing that a tort action may be
brought in the parish in which "damages were sustained" does
not apply if "the damage incurred by the plaintiffs is so subjectively nebulous that it could be litigated in any parish of their
choice ....
2 Otherwise, one seeking damages for mental anguish
could litigate in any one of several parishes in which he sustained mental suffering. Mental anguish is so nebulous that
if considered apart from the act causing it, plaintiff would be
given an unlimited choice of venue not intended by the drafters
of the Code. Coursey v. White, 184 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1966).
The general rule of venue is that an action must be instituted
at the domicile of the defendant.3 It is ordinarily a defendant's
1. "An action for the recovery of damages for an offense or quasi offense
may be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct occurred, or in the
parish where the damages were sustained. An action to enjoin the commission
of an offense or quasi offense may be brought in the parish where the wrongful
conduct occurred or may occur."
"As used herein, the words 'offense or quasi offense' include a nuisance and
a violation of Article 667 of the Civil Code." (As amended, La. Acts 1962,
No. 92, § 1.)
2. Coursey v. White, 184 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
3. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PIRocEnuE art. 12 (1960) : "The general rules of venue
are that an action against:
"(1) An individual who is domiciled in the State shall be brought in the
parish of his domicile ... "
The official "comments" or "preliminary statement" of the redactors of the
Code. preceding § 1, ch. 2, sets forth the intent of the legislature: "In Louisiana
the parishes fixed for the venue of most actions are the defendant's domicile or
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right to be sued in the court of his domicile, 4 and he may not be
sued over his objection in a court of improper venue. 5 Exceptions to the general rule must be specifically authorized by statute, 6 and a plaintiff who claims the benefit of an exception must
bring himself clearly within it.7
Prior to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960, one statutory
exceptiu- to the general rule was article 165(9) of the Code of
Practice of 1870,8 which provided that any defendant could be
sued in the parish where damage was caused by his act of commission. A later amendment added that corporate defendants
could be sued in the parish in which damage was sustained as a
result of an act of omissionf The jurisprudence is clear that the
exception to the general venue rule only applies to ex delicto
damages, and if a claim was presented for both contractual and
tortious damages, recovery would be limited to the ex delicto
damages. 10 It was not necessary that the acts of commission
which gave rise to the suit be accomplished by force, violence, or
duress.' If a plaintiff could utilize the exception to the general
venue rule, the action could be instituted in the "parish where
the damage was done or trespass committed. '12 The Louisiana
Supreme Court interpreted this exception narrowly. In Devons
v. Lee Logging Co., 13 defendant, a resident of Webster, furnished
plaintiff a defective wagon in Webster Parish for use in Winn
place of business, the situs of property involved in the suit, or the place where
the cause of action arose. The substance of these rules has been retained in
this code."
4. See McFeeley v. Hargrove, 166 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
5. See Boyett v. King, 180 So. 168 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
6. See Tennent v. Caffery, 170 La. 680, 129 So. 128 (1930).
7. See Clover v. Mayer, 209 La. 599, 25 So. 2d 242 (1946).
8. La. Code of Practice art. 165(9) (1870) provided: "Trespass. In all cases
where any person, firm or domestic or foreign corporation shall commit trespass,
or do anything for which an action for damage lies or where any domestic or
foreign corporation shall fail to do anything for which an action for damage lies,
such person, firm or corl)oration may be sued in the parish where such dainage
is done, or trespass committed or at the domicile of such person, firm or corporation."
9. See Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 165 So. 453 (1936) ; Gibbs v. Stanfill,
94 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) ; Armand v. Bordelon, 53 So. 2d 168 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1951); layes v. Oertel, 195 So. 388 (La. App. Oil. Cir. 1940)
Esthay v. 'McCain, 180 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
10. See Lottinger v. Mark II Electronics, 179 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964) ; Chronister v. Creole Corp., 147 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
11. Esthay v. McCain, 185 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
12. "Trespass," within the meaning of La. Code of Practice art. 165(a)
(1870), permitting suit in the parish where the damage is done or "trespass
committed" is used in the broad sense of any act that injures another, and
not in the technical or narrow sense of the term.

La. 66, 165 So. 453 (1936).
13. 121 La. 518, 46 So. 614 (1908).

See Tripani v. Mernux, 184
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Parish. Plaintiff was injured in Winn while using the wagon
and filed suit for damages there. When the case arose, article
165(9) did not contain the amended provision that a corporation could be sued where the damage was done when it "failed
to do anything. ' 14 The court held that defendant committed no
act of commission; this suit arising out of an act of omission
could not be brought away from the domicile of the defendant.
In Tripani v. Meraux, 15 plaintiff was bitten in Orleans Parish
by a dog owned by defendant, who resided in St. Bernard Parish. Suit was filed in Orleans. The court held that since there
was no act of commission article 165(9) was not applicable to
this individual defendant as an exception to the general rule that
venue is the domicile of defendant. It pointed out that only a
corporation could be sued away from its domicile for acts of
16
omission. Had defendant's breach of duty been a positive act,
suit could have been filed in Orleans where the damage was
sustained. Chief Justice O'Niell said in O'Brien v. Delta Air
Corp., 7 with reference to the parish where damage is done, "that
means the parish in which the negligence or the failure in the
performance of a duty occurred. It does not mean, necessarily,
the parish in which the injured party actually was at the time
when he was injured.""' It is submitted that a correct application of 165(9) was made in Bourgeois v. Beeson-Warner Ins.
Agency,' 9 involving the failure of an Orleans Parish corporation
to place burglary insurance coverage on plaintiff's Jefferson
Parish property. Plaintiff sustained an uninsured burglary loss
and sued the insurance agency in Jefferson Parish. The court
of appeal held the loss was sustained and the damage done in
Jefferson Parish; consequently, Jefferson Parish was the proper
venue for the action under the explicit terms of article 165(9).
The redactors of the Code of Civil Procedure changed several
portions of article 165(9). Article 7420 applies to acts of commission as well as of omission, and applies to all defendants;
the distinction between omission and commission and between
individuals and corporations is abandoned. It appears clear that
14. La. Code of Practice art. 165(9) (1870) was amended in 1914 to include
the failure of a corporation to do an act.
15. 184 La. 66, 165 So. 453 (1956).
16. See Esthay v. McCain, 185 So. 235 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
17. 188 La. 911, 920, 178 So. 489, 492 (1938).
18. See also Town of Eunice v. M. & L. Constr. Co., 123 So. 2d 579 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1960).
19. 144 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
20. See note 1 supra.
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the legislature set forth two places, besides the domicile of the
defendant, as proper venue for actions arising out of offenses
or quasi-offenses: where the wrongful conduct occurred, or the
parish where the "damages were sustained." It is indicated that
21
the exception article 74 provides to the general rule of venue
22
will be strictly construed.
In the instant case the alleged wrongful seizure took place
in Livingston Parish, and plaintiff filed suit in Orleans Parish,
his domicile. He claimed damages for mental anguish and damage to his credit record, both of which he alleged were incurred
in Orleans Parish. The court considered these claims so "subjectively nebulous ' 23 that to allow the suit in Orleans Parish
would be to divide the main element of damage - injury caused
by the wrongful seizure itself - from an indirect element mental distress resulting from the seizure - in order to allow
the plaintiff to choose his own venue. The ratio decidendi was
limited to the facts of the instant case because the court felt
that in most situations of a delictual nature the place where the
damages are sustained is easily determined. The court was concerned with the possibility of "forum shopping" and the fact
that mental anguish indirectly resulted from the main cause of
damage, the wrongful seizure.
The pleadings in the instant case disclose an attempt to draw
a parallel between the present situation and libel actions. In
libel a suit can be filed in the parish where the damages are sustained, whether those damages are direct or indirect. 24 Initially
this would seem to be a valid analogy since both are multi-parish
actions; however, it must be noted that in libel suits there is an
act committed in each parish by the dissemination of the statement. In the instant situation the mental damages were hard
to assess apart from the main element. The jurisprudence contains many cases recognizing mental anguish as a substantial
element of damage; however, in all of these cases the mental
anguish was accompanied by some act or omission on the part of
the defendant.2 5 In the instant situation the court characterized
21. Coursey v. White, 184 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
22. See Anglade v. Hemenway Furniture Co., 151 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 1963).

23. 184 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
24. See Walker v. Associated Press, 162 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
25. See Comment, 26

(1963).

LA. L.

REv. 512

(1965); Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 473
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the damage as "indirectly resulting '
in Livingston Parish.
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from the act committed

It is submitted that the court adopted a restricted view of
article 74. It qualifies the phrase "where the damages were sustained" to mean there must be independent damage and it cannot be "indirectly resulting" from another cause of action. This
will prevent "forum shopping" in the situation where the injury
occurs in one parish and the injured party goes to another parish to recover from the injury but carries the pain with him.
Article 74 had as one of its purposes the remedying of earlier
cases 27 in which the wrongful conduct occurred in one parish
and the damages were sustained in another. The court in the
instant case seems to indicate that this remedy will be available
only where there is a substantial damage incurred in a second
parish. This interpretation will serve to prevent the splitting
of a cause of action in order to allow the plaintiff to pick capriciously the venue in which he will sue.2 1 It is submitted that
the apparent desire of the legislature, to prevent forum shopping
yet allow the action to be brought in the parish where the damage was sustained, should not be limited as in the instant case.
It seems the court has injected a new question into all tort actions, that of whether the damages claimed are "direct and
determinable" or whether they are "indirect and subjectively
nebulous."
Charles S. McCowan, Jr.
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SYSTEMATIC

INCLUSION IN JURY SELECTION

Brooks, a Negro, was indicted for rape of a white woman by
a grand jury impaneled under a system that excluded Negroes.
Aware that Brook's indictment was invalid because of a decision
rendered since the original indictment,' the district judge appointed a new jury commission. This commission selected sixteen prospective jurors, two of them Negroes, who were also
chosen for the new grand jury that re-indicted Brooks. A mo20. 184 So. 2d 625, 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
27. See note 8 supra.
28. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 425 (1960).

1. Stoker v. State, 331 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960). Conviction reversed and indictment dismissed because of 50-year history of exclusion of Negroes
on the grand jury list.

